Top 5 Countries Most Mentioned in Vladimir Putin's 'Results of the Year' speech

Syria: 35 mentions

Ukraine: 34 mentions

United States: 29 mentions

Israel: 12 mentions

Top 5 Topics or Issues

Russian Solidarity

Russia's Positions in the Ukraine War

Potential Negotiations Between Moscow and Kyiv

Bashar al-Assad’s Fall and Russia

Collapse of the Syrian Regime and Israel

DNA reviewed Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s 2024 ‘Results of the Year’ speech, a tradition that began in 2001 shortly after he succeeded President Boris Yeltsin who stepped down on the 1999-2000 millennium New Year’s Eve. The speech was chronicled and prominently featured by the Kremlin’s flagship state-sponsored Spanish language media outlet, RT (Russia Today) en Español, which has offices throughout Latin America and more than 200 Spanish-speaking employees in Moscow. In 2023, the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford found that “RT en Español is more successful than any of the other services of RT, which include English, Arabic, German and French,” and that “Spanish-language channels became even more important after Vladimir Putin launched [a] full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.” The speech was also documented in real time by Sputnik Mundo, a Spanish language Russian state sponsored media agency, which reported that Putin’s discussion points were chosen after his team received nearly 2.5 million questions and complaints at a government “hotline.”

Russia's Patterns and Propaganda Techniques

RT reported that during Putin’s 2024 'Results of the Year' speech, he spoke about the purported “growth” of Russia’s economy, “advances at the front” in terms of Moscow’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s supposed desire to engage in “peace negotiations” with Kyiv. Putin insisted that since the war started, “Russia has become stronger,” and stated that Moscow had “achieved its goals” in Syria despite the fall of Kremlin-ally Bashar al-Assad. On New Year's Eve, Putin referred to Russia as “independent, free and strong,” and insisted that its people could be “legitimately proud of what we have done” because the country was “united.”

Russia's Economy

On Dec. 19, Russia Today en Español chronicled Vladimir Putin’s 2024 ‘Results of the Year’ speech. RT opened up its story, reporting that “Putin said the economy has grown by about 8% in two years … compared with the results in the U.S., where growth is between 5% and 6%, and in the eurozone, where it reaches 1%.” RT then added that Putin said, “unemployment in Russia stands at an all-time low of 2.3%” … the country’s economy is ‘stable,’ despite ‘external threats’ [and that] according to his statements, GDP growth in Russia at the end of the year could be 4%.”

RT also added that, “Putin emphasized that international financial institutions place Russia in first place in Europe in purchasing power parity, while globally they [rank] it in fourth place, after China, the U.S. and India. In addition, the president described the current inflation of 9.2-9.3% in Russia as an ‘alarming sign,’ but emphasized that wages have grown by 9% in real terms and admitted that the population's disposable income has also increased.”

DNA compared RT’s presentation of Putin’s assertions to other reports. A Jan. 9, 2025 report published by The Moscow Times reported that Putin’s claim of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth and low unemployment is technically, numerically accurate. The Times reported that GDP grew by 3.6%, and that “the Russian economy has repeatedly defied expectations.” In fact, a Dec. 1, 2024 Wall Street Journal report indicates that the Chinese Communist Party has been so impressed with Moscow’s ability to evade sanctions, the People’s Republic has created an interagency commission to study Russia’s economic model.

According to a Nov. 29, 2024 report filed by Statista, a German online platform that specializes in data gathering with more than 1,000,000 statistics and more than 22,500 sources in over 150 countries, “Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to grow by 3.65 percent in 2023 compared to the previous year. To compare, in 2022, the country’s GDP dropped by around 1.25 percent.”

While GDP increased and unemployment decreased, The Moscow Times reports that Russia’s “image of resilience is deceptive.” According to the independent English-language and Russian-language online newspaper, Russia’s economic success is based on an unusual, but unsustainable combination of factors including record hydrocarbon export revenues, government expenditures, and state-subsidized loan programs. “Such conditions are exceptional, even among authoritarian regimes, making the Kremlin’s economic model an anomaly rather than a replicable template for success,” the Times reports.

According to a September 2024 report published by the Russian Ministry of Finance, Moscow’s fiscal stimulus totaled more than 10% of the nation’s GDP while loan portfolios exceeded 15 trillion rubles ($150 billion). The Times reports that, “this extraordinary expenditure has turned the military-industrial complex into the main engine of economic expansion.”

From 2022 to 2024, the fiscal stimulus amounted to over 10% of GDP, while preferential loan portfolios in the banking sector surpassed 15 trillion rubles ($150 billion). According to Rosstat, Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service, GDP growth actually dropped from 4.1% to 3.1% during its third quarter last year. An October 2024 bulletin published by the Bank of Russia’s Department of Research and Financing suggests that while retail businesses continue to remain successful because of consumer spending, business is slowing because of the rising inflation rate.

According to the Times, “While industries linked to defense production continue to grow, their pace is far below last year’s levels. Other sectors are faltering: extractive industries face declining production due to lower hydrocarbon export prices and OPEC+ production cuts, while agriculture has also lost momentum.”

Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

RT Actualidad used the Kremlin’s nomenclature to refer to its invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “special military operation,” and quoted Putin, who said Moscow’s “fighters are recovering territory by square kilometers every day” and that “Russia has become stronger, a truly sovereign country.” RT characterized these statements by reporting that, “the Russian Army’s combat preparedness is now the highest in the world.”

The Kremlin state sponsored Spanish language news organization added that Putin said he “is willing to hold peace negotiations with Kiev,” but insisted that “Ukraine refused,” that Putin opposes a cease fire,” and instead favors “a long-term peace [agreement] with guarantees for Russia.” RT en Español reported “that Russia will talk to the leader of the Kiev regime, Volodymyr Zelensky, if he [holds] elections and gains legitimacy … Moscow will only sign peace documents with a legitimate leader of Ukraine.”

DNA compared Putin’s statements about Russian advances with a Dec. 31, 2024 report published by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a U.S. think tank that provides research and analysis of foreign affairs and armed conflicts. According to the ISW, Russia did make advances, but at a significant cost. “Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024 …  indicating that Russian forces have suffered approximately 102 casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized …”

A prior Dec. 24, 2024 ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment reported that on Dec. 24, 2024, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed Russia enlisted 440,000 recruits for military service, and that Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov said just a few days prior that Moscow enlisted 427,000. Citing communications captured on Telegram, the ISW added that “this number of recruits unlikely represents recruitment based on solely voluntary basis.”

A Christmas Eve post from the Russian language Mobilization News Telegram channel corroborates this, reporting that, “Relatives of conscripts continue to fight for their lives. More than ten families are demanding an understanding of the situation in the Chebarkul unit, where conscripts are deceived into signing contracts. In addition to psychological pressure, some of the boys were subjected to physical violence, relatives said …”

In terms of pursuing peace negotiations, DNA analyzed a chronology of Russia’s willingness to negotiate with Ukraine for the past year.

During Putin’s Dec. 15, 2023 annual press conference, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” the Russian leader said, “there will only be peace in Ukraine when we achieve our aims,” calling for “denazification, demilitarization and its neutral status” as conditions for an end to the war.

In a Feb. 8, 2024 interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson, Putin said he was open to negotiations, but wanted to keep all the territory Russia had illegally occupied since the February 2022 invasion started. On Feb. 14, 2024, the Kremlin denied that Putin had secretly proposed a ceasefire.

During a March 4, 2024 speech, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Dmitry Medvedev ruled out peace talks with Volodymyr Zelensky and said that if a new, future Ukrainian government wanted to negotiate for peace, Kyiv would have to accept Russian occupation. Nine days later on March 13, 2024, Putin said that “To negotiate just because they (Ukraine) are running out of ammunition is somehow ridiculous on our part. We are, however, ready for a serious conversation, and we want to resolve all conflicts, especially this conflict, through peaceful means. But we must clearly understand that it shouldn't be a break for the enemy to rearm but a serious talk involving security guarantees for the Russian Federation.”

On June 14, 2024, Putin said that Russia would not negotiate unless Ukraine conceded all the provinces it had occupied, abandoned its plans to join NATO and surrendered its future rights to rearm itself with nuclear weapons (Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in 1994 as part of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, in which Russia promised to never invade). Putin also demanded that sanctions from the U.S. and its allies must be removed and added that if Ukraine and the West rejected his offer, that it would be “their political and moral responsibility for continuing the bloodshed.” During this month, representatives from 92 nations and 8 international organizations held the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, in hopes of resolving the Russo-Ukrainian War, but Russia did not attend.

On July 10, 2024 Medvedev said in a post on his Telegram channel that even if Zelenskyy agrees to Putin’s most recent conditions for peace, it will not constitute the “end of the Russian military operation” in Ukraine. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Medvedev “reaffirmed that Russia would not accept or uphold any negotiated peace settlements with Kyiv short of Ukrainian capitulation, the destruction of the entire Ukrainian state, and the full occupation of Ukraine.”

On Nov. 7, 2024 Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said that “the situation in the theatre of military operations is not in favor of the Kyiv regime,” and that “the West is faced with a choice, to continue financing it and destroying the Ukrainian population or to recognize the current realities and start negotiating.”

In summary, DNA’s analysis found that Russia’s terms to negotiate throughout 2024 were conditionally based on Ukrainian surrender of occupied territories and its willingness to accept status as a neutral state without NATO membership. Moscow has at times, also required the West’s willingness to remove economic sanctions against Moscow as part of a condition to end the war. These conditions are not too dissimilar than the Kremlin’s conditions during the 2022 Istanbul Communiqué shortly after Russia first crossed into Ukrainian territory. The Public International Law & Policy Group, a non-profit that provides legal counsel to developing states and nations immersed in conflict, called the 2022 plan “A Blueprint for Ukraine’s Capitulation.”

In terms of Volodymyr Zelensky’s legitimacy, the Ukrainian President was democratically elected in 2019 in a landslide victory to a five year term that was slated to end May 2024. The elections were determined to be free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A May 20, 2024 BBC report said Ukraine would have held presidential elections, but the martial law brought in with Russia’s full-scale invasion means that can’t happen,” adding there was “broad public support” to extend Zelensky’s term during wartime. The report added that, “today around 65% of Ukrainians still trust President Zelensky to guide them through these times.”

Russia's Presence in the Middle East

In the final section of its analysis, RT en Español highlighted Putin’s discussion of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power and flight to Moscow. RT quoted Putin saying that the United Russia regime “hope[s]” there is peace and tranquility,” in the region, and reported that the Russian leader said it was important to consider whether Moscow maintained military bases in Syria. RT reported that Putin said that Assad’s fall did not mark a defeat for Russia, insisting that, “In general, we have achieved our goals … to “prevent the formation of a terrorist enclave similar to what was observed in some other countries such as Afghanistan.”

Putin then commented on how Assad’s fall impacted the West, suggesting that, “today many European countries and the United States want to establish relations … the groups that previously fought against the Al Assad government …” He then added that “Israel is the main beneficiary of what is happening in Syria,” and implied that the Jewish homeland was interested in invading the country, adding that “Russia condemns the capture of any Syrian territory.”

Putin’s assertion that Moscow’s goals were aimed at preventing terrorism in Syria was contrasted by The Washington Institute. On Dec. 17, 2024, senior fellow Anna Borshchevskaya wrote that, “Backing Assad’s brutal regime was never really about Syria but about wielding the power and influence sustained by continuing conflict with the West, wherever it arises.”

Mary Glantz, Acting Director of the United States Institute for Peace’s Russia and Eurasia Center wrote in a Dec. 12, 2024 report that, “There are multiple reasons why Russia supported Assad. First, and perhaps most importantly, Russia wanted to keep Assad in power because the Kremlin believed it would be a blow to the United States and its allies and friends … Preventing the deposition of Assad, therefore, would allow Russia to deal a rebuff to the U.S.-led world order and what Putin perceived as its effort to spread democracy. Second, keeping Assad in power helped assure the Kremlin of the continuation of its military presence in that strategically important region.”

Putin’s second assertion, that “Assad’s fall did not mark a defeat for Russia” was contrasted by both Western analysts and Russian observers of the war.

A Dec. 10, 2024 report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, which suggested the dictator’s fall was just the latest sign of Moscow’s diminishing power. According to the CFR, “Moscow’s reputation in the Middle East paradoxically began to wane after the terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 … the unfolding conflict in the region underscored how little a role Russia could actually play. No one turned to Moscow for a resolution of the conflict; all eyes turned to Washington. China even stepped in with a more adroit diplomatic role than Russia …” The CFR added that “salvaging [Russia’s] strategic military bases in Syria” was “critical to its ability to project power in the Middle East.”

Tatyana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, also wrote on the X social media platform that “Assad's collapse has ... shaken Putin, making him less inclined to demonstrate flexibility with Ukraine …”

A Dec. 9, 2024 report published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty revealed that Russian war bloggers also said Assad’s fall was significant, and “voiced alarm about the potential loss of Russian bases in Syria.”

“Russia’s military presence in the Middle East region hangs by a thread,” wrote ‘Rybar,’ a blogger with links to Defense Ministry,” wrote in a Telegram post. Another Telegram post published before Assad’s fall by prominent blogger ‘FighterBomber’ prophesied that such an event would deprive the Russian armed forces of much needed military personnel and hardware. “It is almost impossible to evacuate the bases,” they wrote. “In the best case, it is possible to evacuate most of the personnel, documentation and serviceable aircraft. Some equipment that’s still running can be packed into dry cargo ships and landing ships, but of course not all. All the rest of the property will remain at the bases.”

Finally, Putin’s third assertion, that Israel was “the main beneficiary” of Assad’s fall was contrasted by a Dec. 9, 2024 Israel Policy Forum (IPF) report and Israeli officials. The IPF conceded that Assad was “a staunch enemy of Israel,” but that he was also a familiar and predictable rival and that “the strategic effects of [his] fall were mixed for Israel.”

On Dec. 8, 2024 Al Jazeera’s Zein Basravi concurred with Putin’s assessment that Israel was taking advantage of the Assad regime’s collapse, saying that, “what is happening is certainly to the benefit of the Israeli military, of the Israeli government. They are getting what they have said they have wanted all along: weaker neighbors, so that they can push their regional agenda.” Al Jazeera also cited Israeli media, which reported that the Israeli air force “bombed weapons depots in southern Syria and Damascus to prevent opposition groups from seizing them,” and quoted a social media post from the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesman, Col. Avichay Adraee, who sent a message to Syrian civilians: “The fighting in your area is forcing the IDF [Israeli military] to act and we do not intend to harm you.”

Russian Propaganda Alert Coordinators

David A. Satter

David A. Satter is an American journalist and historian who writes about Russia and the Soviet Union. He has authored books and articles about the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of post-Soviet Russia. Mr. Satter is a member of the board of the Digital News Association and was expelled from the Russian Federation in 2013.

Jeffrey Scott Shapiro

Jeffrey S. Shapiro is an investigative journalist and former Washington, D.C. prosecutor. He has reported on several high-profile criminal and political cases, including the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, the 2011 military intervention in Libya, and U.S. military cooperation with the Russian space program.  Mr. Shapiro is a board member of the Digital News Association and was banned from entering Russia in 2023.

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